

PARTIAL TRANSCRIPTION - ORIGINAL FOLLOWS

2. SUMMARY AS THE FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF THE "GREAT [ILLEG] REVOLUTION OF APRIL 27-28, 1978 APPROACHES, THE CRITICAL LEVERS OF POLITICAL POWER IN THE REVOLUTIONARY DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN (DRA) -- THE CADRE OF THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF AFGHANISTAN (PDPA), THE MILITARY, AND THE SECURITY ELEMENTS OF THE BUREAUCRACY -- STILL APPEAR TO REMAIN LOYAL TO THE REGIME AS LONG AS THESE PRINCIPAL PILLARS DO NOT COLLAPSE OR BECOME SERIOUSLY WEAKENED, OUR PROGNOSIS -- AT LEAST IN THE SHORT TERM -- IS FOR THE DRA'S SURVIVAL, NONETHELESS, STRONG OPPOSITION STEMS FROM ANY NUMBER OF SOURCES, THE MOST SIGNIFICANT BEING THE WIDESPREAD PERCEPTION AMONG THE POPULACE THAT THE GOVERNMENT IS COMMUNIST, ATHEISTIC, AND UNDULY PRO-RUSSIAN, BELIEFS THAT STIR UP EXTREME HOSTILITY IN THIS DEVOUTLY MUSLIM AND TRADITIONALLY INDEPENDENT SOCIETY.

[SECOND COLUMN]

4. ROUGH SAILING UNDOUBTEDLY LIES AHEAD FOR THE KHALQIS BUT IF THE ESSENTIAL DOMESTIC EFFORTS OF THE DRA REMAIN LOYAL AND THE [WORDS ILLEG] AND ECONOMIC [ILLEG] AND IF [ILLEG] NECESSARY MILITARY INTERVENTION, A LEFTIST REGIME AT [ILLEG] COULD WELL REMAIN A FACT OF POLITICAL LIFE ON THE SOUTH ASIAN SCENE FOR SOME TIME TO COME. END OF SUMMARY.

15. 1944

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100-451842-44-46a

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT  
 AMEMBASSY BAGDAD  
 AMEMBASSY CAIRO  
 AMEMBASSY LEBEY  
 AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
 AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI  
 AMEMBASSY PARIS  
 AMEMBASSY TEHRAN  
 GINCPAC  
 CINCPAC

CINCPAC. FOR FOLIO  
CINCPAC. FOR FOLIO

E.O. 12958 GDS 4-8-85 (TAYLOR, JAMES E ) OR-P  
TAGS: PINK, POCV, FINS, PICT, AS  
SUBJECT: (C) PROBABLE SURVIVAL OF AFGHANISTAN'S ANALOG: ELIGIBLE

1. IC - ENTIRE TEL

2. SUMMARY: AT THE FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF THE "GREAT SOVIET REVOLUTION" OF APRIL 27-28, 1976, APPROXIMATELY, THE OFFICIAL LEVERS OF POLITICAL POWER IN THE REVOLUTIONARY DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN WERE -- THE HEADS OF THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF AFGHANISTAN (PPDA), THE MILITARY, AND THE SECURITY ELEMENTS OF THE BUREAUCRACY -- STILL APPEAR TO REMAIN LOYAL TO THE REGIME. AS LONG AS THESE PRINCIPAL PILLARS DO NOT COLLAPSE OR BECOME SERIOUSLY WEAKENED, OUR PROSPECTS -- AT LEAST IN THE SHORT TERM -- IS FOR THE DRA'S SURVIVAL. NONETHELESS, STRONG OPPOSITION STEMS FROM ANY NUMBER OF SOURCES, THE MOST SIGNIFICANT BEING THE WIDESPREAD PERCEPTION AMONG THE POPULACE THAT THE GOVERNMENT IS COMMUNIST, ATHEISTIC, AND UNBLY PRO RUSSIAN, BELIEFS THAT STIR UP EXTREME HOSTILITY IN THIS DEVOTELY MUSLIM AND TRADITIONALLY INDEPENDENT SOCIETY.

3. POSSIBLE SCENARIOS IN WHICH THIS OPPOSITION MAY MANIFEST ITSELF ARE SEVERAL, INCLUDING: A "PALACE REVOLT" OF PARTY MEMBERS WHOSE DISSATISFACTION WITH THE TARIKHIY LEADERSHIP WOULD PROMPT A MOVE TO INSTALL ALTERNATE POLICY-MAKERS; A SCISM WITHIN THE MILITARY, A POPULIST UPRISING OF THE MASSES (A LA IRAN), AIMED AT ESTABLISHING AN ARABIAN ISLAMIC REPUBLIC, OR, A GRADUAL LOSS OF THE COUNTRYSIDE TO INCURRENTS LEAVING THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IN CONTROL OF THE CAPITAL AND MAJOR CITIES. WHAT SEEMS CLEAR IS THAT EVENTS COULD UNFOLD IN A NUMBER OF WAYS. THE EXTENT OF SOVIET COMMITMENT TO SUPPORT THE CONCEPT OF A LEFTIST REGIME HERE HAS BECOME A CRUCIAL ELEMENT IN THE EQUATION SINCE LAST APRIL'S REVOLUTION, AND RECENT HIGH-LEVEL STATEMENTS EMANATING FROM MOSCOW STRONGLY SUGGESTS THAT THE KRAEMLIN, IN ORDER TO PROTECT ITS OWN INTERESTS AND INVESTMENT, HAS CAST ITS POLITICAL LOT WITH THE CONTINUATION OF SOME FORM OF LEFTIST REGIME HERE. ALTHOUGH MOSCOW MIGHT ELECT TO INSTALL AN ALTERNATE LEADERSHIP SHOULD THE CURRENT KHALOJI TEAM FAIL TO RESOLVE MANY OF THE DIFFICULTIES WHICH IS CONFRONTED.

4. ROUGH SAILING UNDOUBTEDLY LIES AHEAD FOR THE ENALCIS. BUT

IF THE ECONOMIC DOMESTIC SUBJECTS OF THE ORGANIZATION (OIA) AND THE ECONOMIC DOMESTIC SUBJECTS OF THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SUBJECTS (OIA) ARE ADDITIONAL REGULARLY, MILITARY INTERVENTION, A LEFTIST REGIME AT ALL, COULD WELL REMAIN A FACT OF POLITICAL LIFE OF THE SOVIET UNION FOR SOME TIME TO COME END OF SUMMARY

5. THE LEVERS OF POLITICAL POWER IN REVOLUTIONARY AFGHANISTAN ARE FEW. THE PARTY APPARATUS, THE MILITARY, AND, TO A LESSER EXTENT, THE GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACY, REPRESENT THE CRUCIAL LEVERS OF POLITICAL POWER IN REVOLUTIONARY AFGHANISTAN. GIVEN ITS COERCIVE POWER, THE MILITARY IS THE FINAL ARBITER OF ANY POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN THIS COUNTRY, AND THE PARTY LEADERSHIP HAS SPARED NO EFFORT IN ITS CAMPAIGN TO ENSURE THE LOYALTY AND SUPPORT OF THE OFFICER CORPS. SO FAR, AT LEAST, THE KEY ELEMENTS OF THE MILITARY HAVE REMAINED LOYAL AND SUBORDINATE TO THE CIVILIAN LEADERSHIP, DESPITE PURGES OF SOME OF THE MOST POPULAR MILITARY FIGURES, AS WELL AS OF SOME LOWER-RANKING OFFICERS WHO WERE ORIGINALLY FORTHRIGHT SUPPORTERS OF THE DRA. MOREOVER, THE MILITARY HAS, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE RECENT MAJID DISORDER AT HERAT, WHICH SAW THE DEFECTION OF SOME SECOND-LINE UNITS, GENERALLY FOLLOWED ORDERS TO PUT DOWN DOMESTIC UPRISINGS, WHICH IN MANY CASES HAS REQUIRED THE APPLICATION OF CONSIDERABLE FORCE AGAINST FELLOW AFGANS.

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[SECOND COLUMN]

9. THE ROLE OF AFGHANISTAN'S MULLAHS AND OTHER RELIGIOUS LEADERS HAS ALWAYS BEEN INFLUENTIAL IN TERMS OF THE INDIVIDUAL CITIZENS SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONDUCT. BECAUSE OF THE NATURE OF ISLAM'S SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE -- ALTHOUGH A PUBLICLY STATED GOAL OF THE KHALQIS -- HAS NOT BEEN A VIABLE CONCEPT HERE THUS FAR AND THIS REGIME'S RECENT PROTESTATIONS THAT IT IS MONITORING ONLY THE ACTIVITIES OF MULLAHS INVOLVED IN POLITICAL MATTERS ARE PROBABLY NOT BELIEVED BY INDIVIDUAL AFGHANS. GIVEN THE MULLAHS TRADITIONAL PARTICIPATION IN ALL SEGMENTS OF AFGHAN LIFE, THE REGIME'S STANCE MAY BE INHERENTLY SELF-DEFEATING, AND RECENT ARRESTS OF MULLAHS SUSPECTED OF OPPOSITION POLITICAL ACTIVITIES OF SENTIMENTS CAN BE EXPECTED TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE CREATION OF LONG-TERM RESISTANCE ON THE PART OF AFGHANISTAN'S CLERICAL CLASS AND ITS SUPPORTERS.

# Department of State

TELEGRAM

PLS

DATE: 27 APR 85 110547Z

REF: 01  
ACTION: 1

INFO OCT 81 04-12 04-12 04-12 04-12 04-12 04-12 04-12 04-12  
D-1: 100 70 1-01 04-12 04-12 04-12 04-12 04-12 04-12 04-12  
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1. 110330Z APR 79  
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL  
TO SECRETARY OF STATE PRIORITY 3282  
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT  
AMEMBASSY CAIRO  
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN  
CINCPAC  
CINCEUR

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6. THE PARTY APPARATUS IS THE CRITICAL LEVER OF POWER IN THE PURELY POLITICAL SENSE. THE PDPA'S ATTEMPTS TO CREATE BROAD POPULAR SUPPORT FOR THE REGIME'S PROGRAMS BY POLITICIZING THE MASSES HAVE MET THUS FAR WITH MIXED SUCCESS, AND THE FLOW OF THE PARTY'S SUPPORT STILL TENDS TO BE LIMITED TO THE YOUNG, URBAN-BASED, AND REASONABLY WELL-EDUCATED. NONETHELESS, THE FACT THAT AN IDEOLOGICALLY MOTIVATED POLITICAL PARTY IS ATTEMPTING TO BRING MORE AFGHANS INTO THE POLITICAL PROCESS IS A UNIQUE PHENOMENON IN THIS TRADITIONALLY OLIGARCHICAL SOCIETY. INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO DATE INDICATES THAT THE PDPA APPARATUS HAS MAINTAINED ITS INTERNAL DISCIPLINE TO A GREAT DEGREE, AND THAT PURGES OF PERCEIVED DISSIDENTS HAVE NOT ENCOMPASSED MANY HARD-CORE ANALOGS. IT HAS ALSO BEEN OUR OBSERVATION THAT THE PARTY IS ACHIEVING SOME SUCCESS AT INFLUENCING AFGHAN YOUTH THROUGH ITS MANY PROGRAMS DIRECTED AT THAT MOST IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF SOCIETY. (IN A COUNTRY WHERE THE LIFE EXPECTANCY IS ONLY 48, WHY BOTHER WITH THE OLDER GENERATION?)

7. THE BUREAUCRACY, ESPECIALLY THE POLICE AND INTERNAL SECURITY ELEMENTS, COMPRISE AN ESSENTIAL LEVER IN THE EXERCISE OF POLITICAL POWER, ALTHOUGH THESE ELEMENTS GENERALLY FUNCTION AS TOOLS OF THE REGIME, ESPECIALLY IN THE USE OF TERROR, RATHER THAN AS INDEPENDENT ACTORS ON THE POLITICAL STAGE. NEVERTHELESS, AS WAS SEEN LAST APRIL 27, THE POLICE AND SECURITY FORCES MIGHT BE NO MATCH FOR THE MILITARY ONCE THE LATTER DECIDES TO TAKE ACTION. ON THE OTHER HAND, AGSA (THE AFGHAN DOMESTIC SECURITY ORGANIZATION) HAS THE MILITARY WELL PENETRATED, AS DEMONSTRATED BY THE NUMEROUS ARRESTS OF MILITARY OFFICERS.

8. THE NEW ORDER IS TRYING TO DISPLACE THE TRADITIONAL LEVERS OF POWER. THE TRADITIONAL DETERMINANTS OF POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS IN AFGHAN SOCIETY (FOR EXAMPLE, TRIBAL STRUCTURES AND FAMILIAL TIES) HAVE HEADED THE LIST FOR DISPLACEMENT BY THE PDPA APPARATUS, THE LOCAL COMMITTEES FOR THE DEFENSE OF THE REVOLUTION, AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS FOR WOMEN, YOUTH, AND LABOR. IN THIS TRADITIONAL SOCIETY, DISPLACEMENT WILL REQUIRE A GREAT DEAL OF TIME AND EFFORT, HOWEVER, ESPECIALLY IN THE VILLAGES AND COUNTRYSIDE, WHERE OVER 85 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION RESIDES. DESPITE INSTANCES OF RESISTANCE, THE PARTY CADRE HAS FORGED AHEAD WITH ITS EFFORTS IN THESE AREAS, AND IT SEEMS TO HAVE HAD SOME INITIAL SUCCESS IN SUPPLANTING OLD RELATIONSHIPS WITH NEW ONES. ON THE OTHER HAND, GIVEN THE PREPONDERANCE OF THE RURAL POPULATION, FAILURE TO EXTEND THE REGIME'S BASE OF SUPPORT INTO THE COUNTRYSIDE COULD DRASTICALLY NARROW THE DRA'S SCOPE FOR ACHIEVING MANY OF ITS BASIC

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REFORMS

9. THE ROLE OF AFGHANISTAN'S MULLANS AND OTHER RELIGIOUS LEADERS HAS ALWAYS BEEN INFLUENTIAL IN TERMS OF THE INDIVIDUAL CITIZEN'S SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONDUCT. BECAUSE OF THE NATURE OF ISLAM, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE -- ALTHOUGH A PUBLICLY STATED GOAL OF THE ANALOGS -- HAS NOT BEEN A VIABLE CONCEPT HERE THUS FAR, AND THIS REGIME'S RECENT PROTESTATIONS THAT IT IS MONITORING ONLY THE ACTIVITIES OF MULLANS INVOLVED IN POLITICAL MATTERS ARE PROBABLY NOT BELIEVED BY INDIVIDUAL AFGHANS. GIVEN THE MULLANS' TRADITIONAL PARTICIPATION IN ALL SEGMENTS OF AFGHAN LIFE, THE REGIME'S STANCE MAY BE INHERENTLY SELF-DEFEATING, AND RECENT ARRESTS OF MULLANS SUSPECTED OF OPPOSITION POLITICAL ACTIVITIES OR SENTIMENTS CAN BE EXPECTED TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE CREATION OF LONG-TERM RESISTANCE ON THE PART OF AFGHANISTAN'S CLERICAL CLASS AND ITS SUPPORTERS.

10. PRINCIPAL SOURCES OF OPPOSITION. THE PRIMARY STIMULUS FOR MOST OF THE OPPOSITION TO THIS REGIME IS THE WIDESPREAD PERCEPTION THAT THE RULING PARTY AND ITS LEADERSHIP IS CORRUPT, GODLESS, AND HAS SOLD OUT AFGHAN INDEPENDENCE TO THE RUSSIANS. IN THIS STRONGLY ISLAMIC AND INDEPENDENT SOCIETY, SUCH A PERCEPTION COULD REPRESENT TWO STRIKES AGAINST ANY GOVERNMENT, THEREBY ILLUSTRATING THE UPRISAL STRUGGLE THIS REVOLUTIONARY REGIME FACES IN ITS EFFORTS TO CONSOLIDATE ITS SECURITY. ORGANIZED OPPOSITION ON THE PART OF AFGHAN MULLANS HAS NOT YET BEEN FIRMLY IDENTIFIED, BUT THE CONTENTMENT WHICH ALL MUSLIMS -- AND ESPECIALLY TRADITIONAL AFGHANS -- HAVE FOR ATHEISTIC PROVIDES A FERTILE FIELD IN WHICH ANY FUTURE, RELIGIOUSLY-BASED OPPOSITION EFFORT COULD TAKE ROOT.

11. MORE SPECIFICALLY, SOME OF THE CLERICAL OPPOSITION COULD EVENTUALLY COALESCE AROUND THE INNUVAI-MUSLIM MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD OR THE MINORITY SHI'A SECT, BOTH OF WHICH MAY HAVE TAKEN HEART FROM THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THEIR CO-RELIGIONISTS IN IRAN -- OR AROUND LIFE-MINDED INDIVIDUALS WHO MAY FORM GROUPS OR ORGANIZATIONS YET TO BE IDENTIFIED. ALTHOUGH THE INNUVAIS HAVE GENERALLY BEEN VIEWED AS THE PRIMARY POTENTIAL SOURCE OF CONSERVATIVE RELIGIOUS OPPOSITION TO AFGHAN GOVERNMENTS OVER THE PAST YEARS, THE SHI'A CLERGY, WITH ITS RELATIVELY MORE FORMAL ORGANIZATION AND PRESUMED TIES TO ITS BRETHREN IN IRAN, CONCEIVABLY COULD REPRESENT A FORMIDABLE FOE FOR THE TARAKI-AMIN REGIME, EVEN THOUGH SHI'AS TOTAL ONLY TEN PERCENT OF THE POPULATION. THE DRA ITSELF MAY HAVE REACHED THIS CONCLUSION, AS EVIDENCED BY ITS ROUNDUP OF MANY LEADING SHI'A MULLANS SINCE THE KHOMEINI TAKEOVER IN TEHRAN.

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12. APART FROM THE OPPOSITION PROVOKED BY THE HATRED-OF-COMMUNISTS SYNDROME, SOME OF THE REFORMS INITIATED BY THIS REGIME HAVE ALSO ENGENDERED RELIGIOUSLY-FACED RESISTANCE DESPITE WHATEVER INHERENT ECONOMIC OR SOCIAL MERITS MANY GOVERNORS MAY SEE IN A [ILLEG] OF THESE PRGRAMS. GIVEN THE MUSLIM VIEW THAT ALL ASPECTS OF LIFE ARE INTERTWINED WITH ISLAM, MANY AFGHANS BELIEVE THAT THE REGIME'S REFORM PROGRAMS CONSTITUTE A REJECTION OF ACCEPTED MUSLIM MODES OF BEHAVIOR, RATHER THAN AN ATTEMPT TO OVERCOME ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL BACKWARDNESS.

13. ANIMOSITY TOWARD RUSSIANS STEEPED IN THE EXPERIENCES OF AFGHANISTAN'S HISTORY, ALSO PLAYS AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN CREATING OPPOSITION TO THIS PARTICULAR REGIME, AND THIS ANIMOSITY IS LIKELY TO INCREASE AS IT IS NOW GENERALLY BELIEVED THAT MOSCOW'S SUPPORT IS THE KEY PROP ENSURING THE DRA'S SURVIVAL. ANTI-SOVIET SENTIMENTS SURFACED DURING THE RECENT FIGHTING IN KERAT AS SOVIET ADVISORS WERE REPORTEDLY [ILLEG] OUT AS TARGETS OF THE ANTI-REGIME FORCES.

[SECOND COLUMN]

16. DISGRUNTLED LEFTISTS ESPECIALLY MEMBERS OF THE PARCHAM FACTION WHO HAVE BEEN PRINCIPAL VICTIMS OF THE KHALQI POLITICALLY-BASED FORCES COULD ALSO HARBOR DESIRE FOR REVENUE AND COULD ALSO REPRESENT ANOTHER POSSIBLE SOURCES OF ALTERNATE LEFTIST LEADERSHIP SHOULD THE [ILLEG]-AMIR TEAM COLLAPSE REVENUE, AN OMNIPRESENT FACTOR IN AFGHAN SOCIETY COULD ALSO MOTIVATE THE RELATIVES OF THOSE WHO HAVE BEEN ELIMINATED BY THIS REGIME -- EITHER THROUGH POLITICAL PURGES OR BY THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE SUCH AS IN THE RECENT FIGHTING IN HERAT -- AND OPPOSITION ACTIVITY AT SOME POINT [ILLEG] COULD TAKE ON THE COLORATION OF A COMPLETELY APOLITICAL BLOOD-FEUD WHICH, HOWEVER, COULD BE INDIVIDUALLY DEADLY AND WOULD POSE NO INSIGNIFICANT THREAT TO THE REGIME AND ITS LEADERSHIP.

17. POSSIBLE SCENARIOS IN WHICH SERIOUS OPPOSITION MAY SURFACE.

A. A SPLIT WITHIN THE REGIME'S CIVILIAN LEADERSHIP. A FEW LOCAL OBSERVERS THING THAT DIFFERENCES HAVE DEVELOPED BETWEEN TARAKI AND AMIN, ALTHOUGH, FROM OUR VIEWPOINT, NO CREDIBLE EVIDENCE OF THIS HAS, AS YET, COME TO LIGHT. NEVERTHELESS, WE PRESUME THAT CLIQUES WITHIN THE DRA LEADERSHIP CERTAINLY EXIST, AND THAT A PARTY CADRE STEEPED IN INTRIGUE AND PERSONAL MANEUVER IS NOT NECESSARILY UNIFORM IN ITS SUPPORT FOR ANY PARTICULAR LEADERSHIP. THE PARTY'S TENENTS OF "DEMOCRATIC CENTRALISM" NOTWITHSTANDING, IN OUR

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VIEW, SPLITS WITHIN THE PARTY WILL BECOME EVEN MORE PROBABLY AS PRESSURES ON THE REGIME, BOTH DOMESTIC AND EXTERNAL, INCREASE. LIKEWISE, SHOULD THE PARTY NOT BE ABLE TO BROADEN ITS SUPPORT AMONG THE PEOPLE BECAUSE OF THE PERCEIVED UNPOPULARITY OF THE REGIME'S PROGRAMS OR THE DEGREE TO WHICH IT APPEARS TO HAVE SOLD OUT TO THE RUSSIANS, A "PALACE REVOLT" OUSTING THE CURRENT LEADERSHIP IN FAVOR OF ALTERNATE PARTY LOYALISTS IS NOT INCONCEIVABLE, AND MAY EVEN BE LIKELY.



# Department of State

TELEGRAM

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ACTION

INFO OCT-07 100712 6A-10 105-00 414E-00 000E-00 00-00  
O-01 100-10 1-03 004E-02 000-05 0A-01 00-02  
SS-10 10A-11 00A-01 101E-00 000-01 0A-02 10-14  
000-01 101-02 1111 W

P. 110712Z APR 78

FM AMEMBASSY KABUL  
TO SECRETARY WASHDC PRIORITY 2734

INFO AMEMBASSY KANAKA

AMEMBASSY BEIJING

AMEMBASSY DACCA

AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

CINCPAC

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CINCPAC FOR POLAD

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VERY LIKELY MILITARY TO PLAY A ROLE IN ANY CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT  
HERE. IT WOULD MOST LIKELY SERVE TO PROVIDE, PERHAPS, IN  
PRIOR SOVIET BLESSING, AN ALTERNATIVE-LEFTIST LEADERSHIP TO  
THE TARAKI-AMIN TEAM. THERE PROBABLY EXIST DEDICATED LEFTISTS  
IN THE PRESENT MILITARY HIERARCHY WHO, SHOULD SUPPORT FOR THE  
PRESENT LEADERSHIP ERODE EVEN FURTHER, COULD PLAY SUCH A ROLE,  
ALTHOUGH, ASIDE FROM DEFENSE MINISTER NATAJAR, WE CANNOT PROVIDE  
SPECIFIC IDENTIFICATION AT THIS TIME.

C. AN IRANIAN-STYLE, POPULAR UPRISING LED BY MULLANS.  
TO EMULATE RECENT EVENTS IN IRAN, AN AFGHAN POPULIST MOVE-  
MENT WOULD REQUIRE THE EMERGENCE OF AN ORGANIZATION AND LEADER-  
SHIP WHICH HAS NOT BEEN DETECTED HERE SO FAR, ALTHOUGH THE  
EXISTENCE OF A CLOSET KHOMEINI SOMEWHERE IN AFGHANISTAN CANNOT  
BE RULED OUT. HOWEVER, AFGHANISTAN IS SO FAR BEHIND IRAN IN  
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC "DEVELOPMENT" THAT MANY OF THE ADDITIONAL,  
NON-RELIGIOUS PRESSURES WHICH HELPED TO BRING DOWN THE SHAH  
DO NOT EXIST HERE, NOR ARE THEY LIKELY TO DEVELOP IN THE FORE-  
SEEABLE FUTURE. NONETHELESS, THE VICTORY OF THE KHOMEINI  
MOVEMENT COULD HAVE POTENTIALLY SIGNIFICANT REPERCUSSIONS  
HERE, ESPECIALLY IF THE RECENT DOWNTURN IN AFGHAN-IRANIAN  
RELATIONS CONTINUES UNABATED AND THE LATTER ARE TEMPTED TO  
BECOME INVOLVED IN AFGHAN AFFAIRS.

ON THE OTHER HAND, "POLITICS OF THE MASSES" IS AN ALIEN  
CONCEPT IN THIS COUNTRY, AND THE INDIVIDUAL AFGHAN ON THE  
STREET IS NOT LIKELY TO RISK MUCH WITHOUT A REASONABLE ASSUR-  
ANCE OF POTENTIAL SUCCESS WHICH CAN PROBABLY ONLY BE PROVIDED  
BY SKILLED LEADERSHIP AND ORGANIZATION. IN THIS CONNECTION,  
THE VARIOUS EXILE GROUPS HEADQUARTERED IN PESHAWAR DO NOT,  
AS PRESENTLY CONSTITUTED, IN OUR ASSESSMENT, POSSESS SUFFI-  
ICIENT ORGANIZATION OR LEADERSHIP THAT THEIR EFFORTS WOULD  
REPRESENT A SERIOUS THREAT TO THIS REGIME.

D. A TRIBAL UPRISING.

A TRADITIONAL MEANS BY WHICH AFGHANS HAVE CHANGED THEIR  
GOVERNMENTS HAS GENERALLY BEEN AN UPRISING OF CERTAIN --  
MOST ALWAYS PUSHTUN -- TRIBES WHO MARCHED ON KABUL AND IN-  
STALLED A DIFFERENT RULER, BUT THIS HAS NOT OCCURRED SINCE  
1929. DESPITE THE ONGOING TROUBLES IN THE COUNTRYSIDE, THE  
MODERN WEAPONS SYSTEMS AND COMMUNICATIONS POSSESSED BY THE  
GOVERNMENT PROBABLY REDUCES THIS POSSIBILITY VERY REMOTE

AS LONG AS THE MILITARY UNITS OF THE KABUL REGIME AND THE  
AFGHAN AIR FORCE REMAIN LOYAL. MANY PARTS OF AFGHANISTAN  
HAVE NEVER BEEN UNDER THE COMPLETE CONTROL OF ANY CENTRAL  
GOVERNMENT, AND THE DRA'S LACK OF CONTROL IN SOME AREAS IS,  
THEREFORE, NOT SURPRISING, AND, THEREFORE, NOT NECESSARILY  
ANY SIGN THAT THE REGIME IS ON THE VERGE OF COLLAPSE.

DESPITE THE REAL POSSIBILITY THAT THIS REGIME MAY GRAD-  
UALLY LOSE CONTROL OF LARGER AREAS OF THE COUNTRYSIDE TO  
INSURGENTS, CONTROL OF KABUL, THE OTHER PRINCIPAL CITIES,  
AND THE MAIN LINES OF COMMUNICATION ABOUT IN THE LARGEST SENSE  
TO POLITICAL CONTROL OF THE COUNTRY. IN THIS REGARD, THE  
VIOLENCE IN HERAT CONSTITUTED THE FIRST SIGNIFICANT CHALLENGE  
TO THE REGIME'S AUTHORITY IN A MAJOR URBAN AREA, AND THE "LOSS"  
OF THAT CITY TO ANTI-REGIME FORCES COULD HAVE DEVELOPED INTO  
A POTENTIALLY SERIOUS BLOW TO THE DRA'S STABILITY. THE  
REGIME'S COUNTERACTION -- RUTHLESSLY EMPLOYING OVERWHELMING  
FORCE UNDER THE CONTROL OF LOYAL MILITARY LEADERSHIP AND  
CIVILIAN PARTY CADRE GUIDANCE -- DEMONSTRATED THE DRA'S WILL-  
INGNESS AND ABILITY TO CRUSH OVERT OPPOSITION AND RE-ESTABLISH  
GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY IN THE CITY (SOME FIGHTING IS STILL  
UNDERWAY IN THE SURROUNDING PROVINCE). WE ANTICIPATE THAT  
SIMILAR TACTICS WILL BE USED AGAINST FUTURE SUCH MANIFESTATIONS,  
AND THEREFORE, THE POSSIBILITY OF A SUCCESSFUL TRIBAL MARCH  
ON THE CAPITAL IS PROBABLY NOT IN THE CARDS UNLESS OTHER  
ELEMENTS OF WEAKNESS MANIFEST THEMSELVES AND ATTRACT ATTACH.  
ONE POTENTIALLY SERIOUS VARIATION IN THIS THEME, HOWEVER,  
IS THE POSSIBILITY EMERGENCE OF SCHISMS ALONG ETHNIC LINES LEAD-  
ING TO UNREST BASED ON DEEPLY HELD ANTI-PUSHTUN FEELINGS ON  
THE PART OF THE COUNTRY'S "SECOND-CLASS" CITIZENS IN THE  
SEVERAL OTHER ETHNIC GROUPS. THERE HAS, AS YET, BEEN NO  
FIRM EVIDENCE THAT THIS DEVELOPMENT IS IN THE OFFING, BUT  
SOME TAJIKS, HAZARAS, AND UZBEKS MAY AT SOME POINT DECIDE TO  
TRY AND TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE REGIME'S DIFFICULTIES AND SEEK  
REVENGE FOR PAST PUSHTUN DISCRIMINATION, DOMINATION, AND  
EXPLOITATION.

18. THE SOVIET ELEMENT OF THE DOMESTIC EQUATION IS CRUCIAL.  
IN OUR VIEW (SHARED BY MANY OBSERVERS HERE), THE REGIME'S  
NARROW BASE OF SUPPORT, ITS ALIENATION OF MANY DEVOUT AFGHAN  
MUSLIMS, AND THE RELATIVE UNPOPULARITY OF SOME DRA DOMESTIC  
REFORM PROGRAMS AMONG THOSE ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THEM, --  
FOR EXAMPLE LARGE LANDOWNERS WHO ALSO GENERALLY REPRESENT A  
PART OF THE LEADERSHIP CLASS IN THE VILLAGES -- WOULD ORDINARILY BE  
ENOUGH TO BRING DOWN THE GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSENCE OF ONE  
CRITICAL ELEMENT, SOVIET SUPPORT. RECENT HIGH-LEVEL SOVIET  
MEDIA STATEMENTS REGARDING FOREIGN "INTERFERENCE" IN AFGHAN  
INTERNAL AFFAIRS, COULD WELL BE INTERPRETED AS SOVIET DE-  
CLARATION THAT MOSCOW IS COMMITTED TO THE SURVIVAL OF THE  
CONCEPT OF A "PROGRESSIVE" REGIME IN KABUL, AND THAT ANY  
EFFORTS TO OVERTHROW THE DRA WILL LEAD TO NOTHING BECAUSE THE  
SOVIETS WILL NOT, AS THEY HAVE ALREADY THREATENED, PERMIT  
THE "TIDE OF HISTORY" TO BE REVERSED.

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[SECOND COLUMN]

THERE WILL MOST PROBABLY BE FURTHER INSURGENCIES IN THE COUNTRYSIDE AND [2 WORDS ILLEG] OF FIGHTING IN URBAN AREAS SIMILAR TO THAT WHICH OCCURED IN HERAT.

NONETHELESS, AS LONG AS THE KEY MILITARY UNITS REMAIN LOYAL TO THE KHALQI REGIME, ESPECIALLY THOSE UNITS STATIONED IN AND AROUND KABUL, AS WELL AS THE "STRIKE UNITS" USED TO SUPPRESS RESISTANCE IN HERAT AND THE INTERNAL DISCIPLINE OF THE PARTY CADRE HOLDS THIS PARTICULAR LEADERSHIP IS LIKELY TO SURVIVE FOR THE NEAR FUTURE.

SHOULD ANY UNDETECTED DISAFFECTION WITHIN THE MILITARY DEVELOP AND APPROACH SERIOUS PROPORTIONS, ALTERNATE LEADERSHIP MIGHT BE THRUST FORWARD EITHER FROM WITHIN THE PARTY OR THE MILITARY. WE HAVE LITTLE DOUBT THAT CLIQUES WITHIN THESE ORGANIZATIONS EXIST BUT THEY WILL PROBABLY NOT EMERGE UNTIL THE LEADERSHIP OF THE TARIKI-AMIN TEAM BECOMES PATENTLY COUNTERPRODUCTIVE AND THE INTERNAL SECURITY AGENCIES EITHER COOPERATE WITH THE REGIMES ENEMIES OR SIMPLY DO NOTHING IN THE EVENT OF A COUP.

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ACTION 00A-11

INFO OCT-01 0000Z 24-10 CAME-01 0000 00-02 0-01  
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P R 110330Z APR 79  
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3225

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
AMEMBASSY BEIJING  
AMEMBASSY BAGDA  
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN  
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19. COMMITMENT TO A CONCEPT, HOWEVER, DIFFERS FROM SUPPORT FOR SPECIFIC LEADERSHIP, AND MOSCOW WELL AWARE OF THE DOMESTIC DIFFICULTIES OF THE TARIKAT TEAM AND, AT TIMES, EVEN A BIT EMBARRASSED AT THE PLATONIC PRO-SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY LINE PURSUED BY THE DRA, MAY WARE OF THOUGHTS OF BACKING ALTERNATIVE, LESS CONTROVERSIAL LEADERSHIP. SHOULD THE SITUATION HERE DETERIORATE FURTHER, SUCH LEADERSHIP, WE PRESUME, WOULD HAVE ACCEPTABLE LEFTIST CREDENTIALS (U.G., THE FAILED PAYKHAZ LEADERS), BUT TO BE VIABLE IT WOULD HAVE TO BE PERCEIVED BY THE AFGHAN POPULACE AS MORE INDEPENDENT, NATIONALIST, AND LESS RADICAL ON DOMESTIC ISSUES (ESPECIALLY ISLAM) IN ORDER TO PLACATE SOME OF THE OPPOSITION, AND THEREBY FREE THE SOVIETS FROM SUCH CLOSE IDENTIFICATION WITH THE CURRENT LEADERSHIP. TO OUR KNOWLEDGE, SOVIET EXPRESSIONS OF SUPPORT FOR AFGHANISTAN HAVE NOT SPECIFICALLY ENCOMPASSED AN ENDORSEMENT OF TARIKAT AND AMIN PERSONALLY, AND THE SPONGY "ESCAPE CLAUSE" LANGUAGE INCLUDED IN ARTICLE FOUR OF THE BILATERAL TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP SIGNED LAST DECEMBER 5 COULD REPRESENT A SOVIET DESIRE FOR SOME FLEXIBLE MEANS TO AVOID JUST SUCH A COMMITMENT. NOTWITHSTANDING, THE AMALOI LEADERSHIP HAS FREQUENTLY STATED ITS CONFIDENCE THAT THE USSR HAS GIVEN ASSURANCES OF SUPPORT IN CASE AFGHANISTAN IS THREATENED BY FOREIGN "INTERFERENCE" - THERE IS AN ELEMENT OF IRONY HERE, HOWEVER, BECAUSE THE MORE THIS REGIME APPEARS DEPENDENT ON THE SOVIET PROX, THE MORE UNPOPULAR IT BECOMES DOMESTICALLY FOR HAVING "SOLD OUT" AFGHAN INDEPENDENCE

20. DESPITE THE EXTENT OF DOMESTIC OPPOSITION TO THIS REGIME, THERE IS LITTLE INFORMATION THAT ANY GROUP POSSESSES THE POWER TO NEUTRALIZE THE SOVIET FACTOR, ESPECIALLY IF MOSCOW HAS DECIDED TO EXTEND UNLIMITED SUPPORT TO A MARXIST REGIME HERE -- FOR EXAMPLE, BY SENDING TROOPS. THUS, DESPITE THE CHARACTERISTICALLY AFGHAN FORCES AT WORK ON THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL SCENE, THE ENHANCED SOVIET ROLE SINCE LAST APRIL 27 HAS GREATLY COMPLICATED THE TASK OF ANY GROUP SEEKING TO OVERTHROW THE DRA.

21. PROGNOSIS: SHORT-TERM UNREST, BUT THE DRA CAN SURVIVE. THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT, FOR THE NEAR TERM, AT LEAST, DOMESTIC UNREST, OUTBREAKS OF VIOLENCE, AND GOVERNMENTAL INSTABILITY ARE TO BE EXPECTED. THE REGIME IS UNPOPULAR, AND VIEWED BY VIRTUALLY ALL AFGHANS AS COMMUNIST, GODLESS, AND TREASONOUS.

THERE WILL MOST PROBABLY BE FURTHER INSURRECTIONS IN THE COUNTRY-SIDE AND, PERHAPS, OUTBREAKS OF FIGHTING IN URBAN AREAS - SIMILAR TO THAT WHICH OCCURRED IN HERAT.

NOTWITHSTANDING, AS LONG AS THE KEY MILITARY UNITS REMAIN LOYAL TO THE AMALOI REGIME, ESPECIALLY THOSE UNITS STATIONED IN AND AROUND KABUL, AS WELL AS THE "STRIKE UNITS" USED TO SUPPRESS RESISTANCE IN HERAT, AND THE INTERNAL DISCIPLINE OF THE PARTY CADRE HOLDS, THIS PARTICULAR LEADERSHIP IS LIKELY TO SURVIVE FOR THE NEAR FUTURE.

SHOULD ANY UNDETECTED DISAFFECTION WITHIN THE MILITARY DEVELOP AND APPROACH SERIOUS PROPORTIONS, ALTERNATE LEADERSHIP MIGHT BE THROST FORWARD EITHER FROM WITHIN THE PARTY OR THE MILITARY. WE HAVE LITTLE DOUBT THAT CLIQUES WITHIN THESE ORGANIZATIONS EXIST, BUT THEY WILL PROBABLY NOT EMERGE UNTIL THE LEADERSHIP OF THE TARIKAT-AMIN TEAM BECOMES PATENTLY COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE AND THE INTERNAL SECURITY AGENCIES EITHER COOPERATE WITH THE REGIME'S ENEMIES OR SIMPLY DO NOTHING IN THE EVENT OF A COUP.

A COMPLETE OVERTHROW OF THIS REGIME, AND A POSSIBLE ESTABLISHMENT OF SOME SORT OF "ISLAMIC REPUBLIC", DO NOT SEEM PROBABLE, FIRST BECAUSE THE DRA IS NOT YET THAT WEAK, AND SECOND BECAUSE MOSCOW WOULD PROBABLY EXERT ITS CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE TO SEEN ALTERNATE LEADERSHIP WITH ACCEPTABLE "PROGRESSIVE" CREDENTIALS.

FOR THESE REASONS, WE BELIEVE THAT THE DRA FACES A DUCHEN PERIOD OVER THE NEAR TERM, AND INSTABILITY COULD BECOME EXAGGERATED SHOULD THE DOMESTIC OR EXTERNAL OPPOSITION ATTAIN SOME LEVEL OF ORGANIZATION AND COORDINATION. INCREASED PRESSURE COULD CONCEIVABLY RESULT IN A CHANGE IN LEADERSHIP AND, PERHAPS, A MODIFICATION IN DRA POLICIES, BUT A LEFTIST REGIME PER SE WILL PROBABLY REMAIN IN AFGHANISTAN FOR SOME TIME TO COME.

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